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Georgia Local Government Law: A
Reflection on Thirty Surveys
by R. Perry Sentell, Jr.*
I.

INTRODUCTION

Pulling a survey chain is demanding work. Pulling a survey chain for
thirty years manifests (at best) perseverance. Pulling a survey chain, for
thirty years, around the boundaries of "Local Government Law"
approaches the Sisyphean.' Such obstinacy demands a marking of the
occasion-a staking of the claim that sheer persistence counts for
something. If continuity contributes order, then "Local Government
Law" deserves distinction. Presumably, it numbers among the most
"orderly" of presentations appearing in these annual "Georgia Survey"
issues.

* Carter Professor of Law, The University of Georgia. University of Georgia (A.B.,
1956; LL.B., 1958); Harvard University (LL.M., 1961). Member, State Bar of Georgia.
1. It nevertheless occurred with R. Perry Sentell, Jr., Local Government Law, 44
MERCER L. REv. 309 (1992). [Editor's Note: As of Volume 46 of the Mercer Law Review,
Professor Sentell has contributed for 32 years to the Annual Survey of Georgia Law.]
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Alas, the presumption falters. Rather, review reveals, each year's
installment goes its own way, both in organization and in substance.
Few analytical themes unify the respective articles, and presentation
styles unaccountably ebb and flow. Even subtopic headings "diverge,
combine, appear, and disappear in seeming disorderliness."'
Typically, this untidiness might be blamed on the student editors, but
there is difficulty in that tactic. The author's fight for freedom from
editorial control is famous. The editors have long since despaired of his
conversion. If there is fault, those editors promptly avow, it is the
author's alone.
Slight solace might be taken in analogy. These analytical wanderings
fall only ten years short of the mark set by Moses. Perhaps an
additional decade will bring Commandments of order to this endeavor
as well. Presently, however, such aspirations remain relegated to the
promised land.
Although conditions thus bode awkwardly for a "survey of the
surveys," a few facets might nevertheless be tabulated. At the least,
those facets will place the thirty-year exercise in context. Hopefully,
they will reflect a scholarship of good faith.
Highlights in place, the endeavor will seek observations from the
present occupants of the Georgia Supreme Court and the Georgia Court
of Appeals. What better source for reflection upon three decades of
judicial decisions than justices and judges of the courts that rendered
those decisions?

II. THE THIRTY-YEAR JOURNEY: FOUNDATIONAL FACETS IN
RETROSPECT
Although but a blink of the jurisprudential eye, three decades occupy
a considerable span in "survey years." Thirty annual appraisals of
"Local Government Law" in print provide overwhelming impetus to take
stock. From the mechanically minute to the substantively impressive,
a few points deserve inventory.

2. The phrase belongs to Justice Brennan in his majority opinion for the United States
Supreme Court in Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 210 (1962). The Justice employed the
phrase in reference to the "Political Question Doctrine," an (appropriately) equally nebulous

subject.
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Physical Coverage
One route to placing perspective upon the endeavor comes by emphasis
of physical presences-things and people. The period 1963 to 1992
yielded a full measure of things and people. Tangibly, of course, there
are thirty volumes of the Mercer Law Review, each containing a survey
article on Georgia local government law.' Those articles are analogous
to the motion picture director's completed film, or the architect's finished
structure. Of course, they also analogize to the brick mason's irretrievably leaning outhouse, or the computer programmer's irretractable
glitch.
A

Personalities. More importantly, each article emits its own penumbras-visions of distinctive, and shaping, events and personalities.
These all compete for remembrance.
An earlier facetious reference to the editors should not go uncorrected.
Each is remembered as a delightful and caring young person who
exerted his or her very best efforts in dealing with a thankless perplexity. They are listed below, with apology for evoking an unpleasant
memory, but with deep gratitude.4

3. The citations are as follows: R. Perry Sentell, Jr., Local Government Law, 15
MERCER L. REv. 105 (1963); 16 MERCER L. REV. 147 (1964); 17 MERCER L. REV. 126 (1965);
18 MERCER L. REV. 123 (1966); 19 MERCER L. REV. 114 (1968); 20 MERCER L. REV. 150
(1969); 21 MERCER L. REv. 183 (1970); 22 MERCER L. REV. 227 (1971); 23 MERCER L. REV.
147 (1972); 24 MERCER L. REV. 199 (1973); 25 MERCER L. REV. 177 (1974); 26 MERCER L.
REV. 143 (1974); 27 MERCER L. REV. 141 (1975); 28 MERCER L. REV. 169 (1976); 29 MERCER
L. REV. 189 (1977); 30 MERCER L. REV. 133 (1978); 31 MERCER L. REV. 155 (1979); 32
MERCER L. REv. 137 (1980); 33 MERCER L. REV. 187 (1981); 34 MERGER L. REV. 225 (1982);
35 MERCER L. REV. 233 (1983); 36 MERCER L. REV. 255 (1984); 37 MERCER L. REV. 313
(1985); 38 MERCER L. REV. 289 (1986); 39 MERCER L. REV. 275 (1987); 40 MERCER L. REV.
303 (1988); 41 MERCER L. REV. 287 (1989); 42 MERCER L. REV. 359 (1990); 43 MERCER L.
REV. 317 (1991); 44 MERCER L. REV. 309 (1992).
4. My direct contact editor for each volume was as follows: Manley F. Brown (Vol. 15);
Charles L. Cetti (Vol. 16); Courtney W. Stanton (Vol. 17); Richard M. Qlnick (Vol. 18); H.
Terrell Griffin (Vol. 19); Ralph F. Simpson (Vol. 20); Susan Steger (Vol. 21); Alton M.
Adams (Vol. 22); William H. Pinson, Jr. (Vol. 23); J. Richard Dunstan (Vol. 24); James W.
Smith (Vol. 25); R. Napier Murphy (Vol. 26); Elizabeth R. Francisco (Vol. 27); James E.
Graham (Vol. 28); Robert L. Porter, Jr. (Vol. 29); David C. Will (Vol. 30); Edward D.
Lukemire (Vol. 31); Donald J. Jordan (Vol. 32); Thomas D. Brannan (Vol. 33); Charles R.
Adams III (Vol. 34); Mary M. Cantwell (Vol. 35); Gary L. Mikell (Vol. 36); William H.
Godlove (Vol. 37); Jefferson C. Callier (Vol. 38); David A. Forehand, Jr. (Vol. 39); John C.
Clark (Vol. 40); Wilbur T. Gamble III (Vol. 41); Laura D. Zoltak (Vol. 42); Todd P. Davis
(Vol. 43); and Phillip C. Griffeth (Vol. 44). Many thanks to one and all.

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 46

Technicalities. The law review "purist" may savor a number of
coverage details. For instance, the surveys extend from Volume 15
through Volume 44 of the Mercer Law Review. The surveyed Georgia
Supreme Court decisions span 45 volumes of the GeorgiaReports (217
Ga. through 262 Ga.). The covered Georgia Court of Appeals decisions
transcend 97 volumes of the Georgia Appeals Reports (105 Ga. App.
through 202 Ga. App.). Total summarized decisions extend throughout
290 volumes of the Southeastern Reporter (Second) (125 S.E.2d through
415 S.E.2d).
The three decades also encompassed other defining developments. For
instance, the period overlapped three Georgia Constitutions, each of
which continued the tradition of devoting specific and extensive
attention to numerous details of local government.' The time span also
included two official Georgia codifications.'
Obviously, these changing constitutional and legislative landscapes
impacted in decisive fashion the judicial tending of local government law.
B. The Survey Articles: Pages & Cases
Survey article length runs from a low of 21 pages (Vols. 15 & 20) to a
high of 54 pages (Vol. 24)." The thirty articles consume a total of 981
pages, with an accompanying grand total of 9,048 footnotes.8
An overall scan of the articles (far from exact and not purporting to
include cases treated only in footnotes) yields minimum totals as follows:
772 surveyed cases involving municipalities, and 791 cases dealing with
counties. This amounts to a thirty-year total of 1,563 local government
law cases. Accordingly, each survey article averaged coverage of 25
"municipal" cases and 26 "county" cases, a total (average) of 51 local
government law cases per article. The smallest number of cases (34)
appeared in Volume 15, and the largest number of cases (74) appeared
in Volume 30. Table I indicates the surveyed cases in each volume.

5. These were the Georgia Constitutions of 1945, 1976, and 1983.
6. There was the official Georgia Code of 1933, the gap-bridging unofficial Georgia Code
Annotated, and the Official Code of Georgia Annotated of 1982.
7. In recent years, the editors have placed strict limits on total pages, usually 30 pages
per article.
8. One would assume that this magnitude of footnotes qualified the articles as bona fide
"legal scholarship," but there is a contrary (and vocal) view.
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TOTAL CASES

TABLE I
SURVEYED IN EACH VOLUM

Volume

Cases

Volume

Cases

Volume

Cases

Volume

Cases

15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22

34
37
41
45
44
48
42
50

23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30

55
68
64
60
58
72
59
74

31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38

71
71
55
57
36
37
54
42

39
40
41
42
43
44

46
58
39
37
56
53

30V. 1,563 C.

C. The Survey Articles: Subtopics
As lamented, a degree of analytical inconsistency renders topical
synthesis of the articles somewhat problematic. For reasons undoubtedly seeming sound when preparing individual articles, subtopic changes
occurred over time. Some subtopics experienced further subdivision,9
consolidation,' and even elimination." Confusingly, therefore, cases
may appear inconsistently categorized over the course of the entire
endeavor. This is to confess that confusion and to caution other
prospective surveyors: Be careful-you may have to interpret your own
work.
Confessions aside, it is nevertheless instructive to note the different
subject matter headings appearing throughout the articles. Those
headings constitute the channels through which this thirty-year analysis
of local government law has proceeded. Although municipal and county
discussions utilize a number of common subtopic headings, they also
harbor divergences.

9. E.g., cases which would have appeared under "Officers & Employees" in some
surveys may have been more particularly categorized under "Elections" in other surveys.
10. E.g., a case placed under "Revenue Bonds" in one survey may have found a place
under "Finances" in other surveys.
11. E.g., the heading "Miscellaneous" was employed in two surveys but no more; and
"Taxation" as it applied to ad valorem taxation was dropped from the survey altogether.
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Municipal Subtopics. The surveyed cases on municipal law have
appeared under a total of 23 subtopic headings. One heading ("Liability") appeared in every survey article, and several topics (e.g., "Consolidation," "Extraterritoriality") claimed only one listing during the course of
thirty years. Table II reflects the complete list of subtopics, grouped and
arranged according to their frequency of appearance.

TABLE II
MUNICIPALITIES:

SuBTOPic FREQUENCY OF APPEARANCE

Appearing in over 25 Articles:
Liability (30)
Officers & Employees (28)
Zoning (26)
Appearing in 20 to 25 Articles:
Powers (24)
Contracts (21)
Appearing in 15 to 20 Articles:
Annexation (16)
Legislation (15)
Appearing in 10 to 15 Articles:

Appearing in 5 to 10 Articles:
Courts (6)
Property (5)
Creation and Dissolution (5)

Openness (5)
Appearing in Less than 5 Articles:
Home Rule (4)
Finances (4)
Schools (2)
Miscellaneous (2)
Revenue Bonds (1)
Legislative Control (1)
Consolidation (1)
Extraterritoriality (1)

Taxation (14)
Elections (13)
Authorities (12)
Regulation (11)

County Subtopics. The articles discussed county law decisions
under a total of 24 subtopic headings. No heading appeared in every
article, although "Zoning" came close (29 appearances).
Several
headings (e.g., "Bonding," "Vacating Office") laid claim to only one
appearance. Table III includes the complete list of county subtopics,
grouped and arranged according to their frequency of appearance.
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TABLE III
CouNIEs: SuBToPic FREQUENCY OF APPEARANCE

Appearing in over 25 Articles:
Zoning (29)
Liability (28)
Appearing in 20 to 25 Articles:
Officers & Employees (25)
Taxation (21)
Appearing in 15 to 20 Articles:
Powers (19)
Schools (17)
Legislation (16)
Appearing in 10 to 15 Articles:
Contracts (14)
Authorities (12)
Elections (10)

Appearing in 5 to 10 Articles:
Finances (8)
Home Rule (7)
Openness (7)
Regulation (6)
Appearing in Less than 5 Articles:
Roads (4)
Property (3)
Courts (2)
Condemnation (2)
Revenue Bonds (1)
Bonding (1)
Rapid Transit (1)
Vacating Office (1)
Law Enforcement (1)
Miscellaneous (1)

D. The Survey Articles: Subtopics & Cases
With subtopic headings identified, review now turns to the number of
judicial decisions surveyed under each heading. This association gauges
the subjects' hold on appellate judicial attention during the past thirty
years. Around these substantive mileposts, and virtually no others, the
Georgia courts have evolved modem legal principles of local government.
The results leave students of local government law with much for
Initial groupings again devote separate attention to
reflection.
municipalities and counties.
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Municipal Cases. The total number of court decisions involving
municipalities (772) must be distributed among the 23 subtopic
headings. Table IV effects that distribution and arranges the headings
according to the number of cases treating each of them.

TABLE IV
SUBTOPICS ACCORDING TO NUMBER OF MUNICIPAL CASES
Over 150 Cases:
Liability (195)

20 to 30 Cases:
Annexation (29)
Elections (31)

100 to 150 Cases:
Officers & Employees (101)

10 to 20 Cases:
Authorities (17)
Courts (17)
Property (15)
Openness (11)

50 to 100 Cases:
Powers (99)
Zoning (81)
40 to 50 Cases:
Legislation (42)
Contracts (40)
30 to 40 Cases:
Taxation (38)
Regulation (31)

Less than 10 Cases:
Creation & Dissolution (8)
Finances (6)
Miscellaneous (6)
Home Rule (6)
Schools (5)
Legislative Control (1)
Revenue Bonds (1)
Consolidation (1)
Extraterritoriality (1)

County Cases. The county cases (791) must be distributed among
the 24 subtopic headings. Table V effects that distribution and arranges
the headings according to the number of cases treating each of them.
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9

TABLE V
SUBTOPICS ACCORDING TO NUMBER OF COUNTY CASES

Over 100 Cases:
Taxation (145)
Liability (131)
Zoning (117)
50 to 100 Cases:
Officers & Employees (95)
Powers (63)
40 to 50 Cases:
Schools (45)
30 to 40 Cases:
Legislation (39)
20 to 30 Cases:
Contracts (26)
Authorities (24)
Elections (22)

10 to 20 Cases:
Finances (19)
Regulation (17)
Home Rule (11)
Openness (11)
Less than 10 Cases:
Roads (6)
Property (4)
Courts (4)
Condemnation (3)
Miscellaneous (2)
Bonding (2)
Rapid Transit (2)
Vacating Office (2)
Law Enforcement (2)
Revenue Bonds (1)

Municipal & County Cases. At this juncture, and by process of
exclusion, subtopic headings treated by both municipal and county
decisions can be compared and combined. First, four headings may be
12
excluded as having been treated in municipal but not county cases.
Correspondingly, six topics may be excluded as having been treated in
county but not municipal cases.'

12. Those headings were:

"Creation and Dissolution," "Legislative Control,"

"Consolidation," and "Extraterritoriality."
13. Those headings were: "Roads," "Condemnation," "Bonding," "Rapid Transit,"
"Vacating Office," and "Law Enforcement."
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Exclusions excluded, comparisons may proceed. Table VI presents the
subtopics of municipal-county commonality, as well as the number of
judicial decisions concerning each.

TABLE VI
MUNICIPAL & CouNY JuDicIAL DECISIONS COMPARED
Subtopic
Liability
Zoning
Officers & Employees
Taxation
Powers
Legislation
Contracts
Schools
Regulation
Elections
Authorities
Finances
Openness
Courts
Property
Home Rule
Revenue Bonds
Miscellaneous

Municipal Cases
195
81
101
38
99
42
40
5
31
21
17
6

-County Cases

131
117
95
145
63
39
26
45
17
22
24
19
11
4
4
11
1
2

These comparisons illumine the 18 subject areas around which the
vast amount of municipal and county litigation has swirled over the past
three decades. They forcefully attest to local government's uncanny
affinity for sparking controversy and to the appellate judiciary's capacity
for resolve. Obviously, the courts must regularly visit novel issues and
frequently revisit "settled" ones. In few legal domains, consequently, are
the controlling principles more strikingly made and remade.
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The comparisons also facilitate the effort to combine the cases of
commonality. Table VII elaborates that combination.

TABLE VII
TOTAL MUNICIPAL & COUNTY CASES ON COMMON SUBTOPICS

Subtopic
Liability
Zoning

Total Municipal & County Cases

Officers & Employees

Taxation
Powers
Legislation

Contracts
Schools
Regulation
Elections
Authorities
Finances
Openness
Courts
Property
Home Rule
Miscellaneous
Revenue Bonds

These combinations reveal that judicial activity has touched a
considerable span of local government subject areas during the period
under scrutiny. They also establish, however, that a fairly concentrated
amount of that activity is focused upon a relatively few subjects. Thus
(very roughly calculated), "Liability" has accounted for some 21% of the
appellate courts' decisions (1,563 cases) in local government law.
Additionally, the top five subjects ("Liability," "Zoning," "Officers &
Employees," "Taxation," and "Powers") have borne the overwhelming
brunt of judicial dispensations. They account for a remarkable 68% of
the cases.

MERCER LAW REVIEW
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TABLE VIII
THE DOMNATING COmmON SUBTOPICS
Subtopic

Percentage of Cases

Liability
Zoning
Officers & Employees
Taxation
Powers

21.0%
12.6%
12.5%
11.7%
10.3%

Total

68.1%

These high-profile subjects of local government administration might
well be characterized as litigation lightning rods. Thus, they expose
areas where a bit more local government caution might pay inordinate
dividends. If a substantive survey synthesis is to be attempted,
therefore, it should focus upon these subtopics. They promise the
greatest return.
III. THE THIRTY-YEAR JOURNEY: SUBSTANTIVE TRACINGS
This focus upon so few subjects intends no slight to the importance of
others. On the contrary, some subtopics not attracting voluminous
judicial attention nevertheless yield highly interesting legal principles
(e.g., "Contracts,"14 "Legislation"'"). Yet other "non prolific" subjects
experience the zenith in novel judicial dispensation (e.g., "Home
Rule""6 ). Finally, the sudden appearance of seemingly listless topics in
the articles may actually represent explosive issues whose time simply
arrived (e.g., "Authorities,"" "Openness"'"). From the perspectives of

14. E.g., the proscription against local government contracts purporting to bind
members of the governing authority or their successors.
15. E.g., the legal lore surrounding local or special statutes, the advertisement
requirement for local legislation, and the substantive mandates regarding population

statutes.
16. E.g., the constitutional and legislative evolutions of "home rule" and the Georgia
Supreme Court's reception of those evolutions.

17. E.g., the increasing uses of authorities to accomplish local government purposes and
the judicial perspectives on those uses.
18. E.g., the increasingly incessant demand in recent times for "sunshine" in respect
to both public records and public meetings.
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legal intrigue, novelty, and currency, therefore, the high profile subtopics
do not tell the entire story.
Case law volume does, however, count for something. At the least,
this magnitude of judicial consideration indelibly stamps a remarkably
few topics with inordinate staying power. From beginning to conclusion
of the survey period, these topics have luxuriated in litigation. They are
the topics about which litigants, lawyers, courts, and legislatures most
frequently have fretted and pondered. If shaping epochs have touched
Georgia local government law, these cases should hint at those
phenomena.
At this juncture, therefore, attention devolves to the top four
subtopics.19 They have remained local government's most controversial
subjects for almost one-third of the present century
A.

-LiabilityLocal government liability for the alleged misconduct of officers and
employees dwarfs all other subtopics. For the past thirty years, liability
has extracted more time and attention from Georgia's appellate courts
than any other subject of local government law. "Liability" will
assuredly constitute this century's thorn in the crown of local government administration.
Without the customary effort at completeness, even the broadest
review calls up a host of liability highlights." Issues of all ilk-some
settled, some resettled, and some novel-cascade from the pages of the
survey articles. A mere sketch should prove sufficient to etch the
judicial composite's panoramic outlines.
Throughout, the fabled "function test"remains the appellate judiciary's
classic preliminary exercise in assessing municipal liability. That
exercise pivots upon characterizing the given municipal act from which
the harm allegedly arose. As the-courts operate between "governmental"
fumctions (immunity) and "ministerial" or "proprietary" functions
(liability), the passing years spin out a dazzling array of subject evils.
Street drainage grates inhospitable to narrow bicycle tires, golf courses
raining down errant balls, transit systems jostling their patrons, and

19. The fifth "high profile" subtopic, "Taxation," is not included. As previously noted,
that subject area originally treated local government ad valorem taxation, a topic of prolific
litigation proportions. Subsequently, however, the topic was left to coverage by the survey
article on "State and Local Taxation."
20. This review also forgoes the legal writing tenacity of footnoting to authority for each
observation offered. The developments reviewed are well known to readers of these
surveys, and may be found on the surface simply by scanning the previously cited survey

articles.
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cemetery services that disrupt funerals: these are but a small subsample in the revolving parade of "novel" confrontations. Although
intriguing, each levies a substantive toll on the orderliness ("seamless
web") of liability law.
The parade also showcases the underlying "tests" the courts employ for
administering the "function test" itself. From the maze of periodically
recurring concerns, perhaps it is sufficient to identify one of the most
persistent (and analytically troubling) conundrums. That distinction
goes to the so-called "revenue test," the significance of revenue inuring
to the municipality from the targeted act. In seeking to paint a
"function" as "governmental" or "proprietary," the courts have lavished
enormous energies on a host of revenue inquiries. Did the municipality
charge for the function? Was the function performed "primarily" for
revenue or for a public purpose? Did the function operate at a profit or
incur a loss? Did the function's operation consume all the revenue it
produced? Did the municipality possess charter (or other) authorization
to conduct the function "primarily" for-revenue or otherwise? These are
but illustrative of the endless judicial formulations over the last three
decades. Yet, whatever its guise, the "revenue test" remains a highly
puzzling route to "function" classification.
The traditional exceptions to municipal tort immunity likewise claim
much attention. Of these, perhaps defective streets and sidewalks loom
as the most historic. The surveys unfold a litigational compendium of
circumstances under which this instance of municipal liability attaches.
The courts have grappled with such issues as the defect's nature and
location, the municipality's necessary "knowledge" (actual or constructive) thereof, conditions under which the liability is shared with third
parties (e.g., railroads, state highway departments), and instances in
which "governmenta functions on the streets (e.g., garbage collection)
overpower the street defect liability.
The years under review emphasize the Georgia county's more enviable
position; historically, its sovereign immunity considerably surpassed that
of the municipality. Accordingly, the "function test" falls by the wayside,
and courts are depicted searching instead for increasingly extinct
21
statutory declarations of liability.
Some historic immunity exceptions apply to both municipalities and
counties. None is more imposing than the constitution's prohibition of
"inverse condemnation."22 Accordingly, this exception flashes through-

21. E.g., over many years the courts structured a body of case law around the early
statute expressly imposing county liability for defective bridges. With that statute's repeal,
the articles reveal a subsequent temporary period of decreased liability litigation.
22. GA. CONsT. art. I, § 3, para. 1(a).
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out the pages of the annual surveys, as claimants seek to hurdle the
immunity barrier. The exception itself is not without qualification: the
recoverable damages are not those of tort law, and the distinction
between "eminent domain" (yielding liability) and "police power"
(yielding immunity) is a wispy one. These issues also dot the litigational
landscape of the last three decades.
Although not anchored in the constitution, the local government's
creation or maintenance of a "nuisance" also operates to forfeit immunity. Nuisance claims are both legion and legend, and the surveys
chronicle a number of distinctively "Georgia" developments. One account
traces the supreme court's surprising "revitalization" of the nuisance
claim against municipalities, and the court of appeals' ensuing ten-year
romp through the cases. That liability heyday suffered sunset when the
supreme court abruptly returned to the scene with intonations of
limiting prerequisites. Thereafter, both courts have afforded more
attention to the limits than to the liability.
Another nuisance evolution has long featured a distinction between
municipalities and counties. Although either entity could theoretically
be declared liable in nuisance, the case against the county constituted
something of a misnomer. For unlike municipal nuisances, a county
"nuisance" must consist of conduct rising to the level of a "taking." To
successfully establish a county "nuisance," therefore, the claimant must
present a case of inverse condemnation. The surveys reflect longstanding confusion over this distinction and, recently, a climax. Virtually
without warning, the court of appeals announced the distinction's
demise, and that henceforth county and municipal nuisances were
identical.' Resoundingly rejecting that announcement, the supreme
court reinstated the historic delineation, and it reigns today.24
The passing articles also reflect both excitement and perplexity from
an abrupt about-face by the United States Supreme Court. Reversing
its century-long position, the Court declared local governments to be
"persons" under the federal civil rights statute.2 Because those claims
can be pressed in state or federal courts, Georgia's judiciary has since
labored to formulate guidelines for this "new" domain of local government liability. After a period of some inconclusiveness, the courts now
purport to operate on a continuum. Liability attaches for deprivations
resulting from implementations of intentional policies. Contrarily, there
is no Section 1983 local government liability in "respondeat superior."28

23.

DeKalb County v. Orwig, 196 Ga. App. 255, 395 S.E.2d 824 (1990).

24.

DeKalb County v. Orwig, 261 Ga. 137, 402 S.E.2d 513 (1991).

25.

42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988).

26. Id.
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Liability insurance has played a dominant role in limiting local
government immunity. From fairly early times, statutes expressly
permitted local governments to waive their immunity regarding motor
vehicles by obtaining liability insurance. Not until the Constitution of
1983, however, were counties (and later municipalities as well) held to
waive general tort immunity by procuring (and to the extent of)
insurance. The early 1990s witnessed a constitutional amendment
purporting to reinstate immunity despite insurance, and the "movement"
is presently mired in the supreme court's reactions to that amendment.
Each of these developments prompted all manner of litigation, and the
annual surveys recorded the activity as it unfolded.
A procedural facet in the liability saga remains for brief mention. As
far back as the survey eye can distinguish, claimants desiring to pursue
tort actions against local governments have labored under "notice"
requirements. Prior to filing suit against a municipality, and within six
months of the event, written ("ante litem") notice must be tendered the
governing authority. That document affords the officials information on
specified basics of the claim, and the officials are accorded a period of
time for consideration. For claims against counties, statutes mandate
written notice within twelve months of "accrual."
A remarkable
amount of case law explicates each of these notice requirements.
Although steadfastly professing a "substantial compliance" approach, the
appellate courts have delved into virtually every nook and cranny of the
"notice" procedure. In mass, the survey articles describe a free-standing
body of "law" evolving each requirement.
Severely abbreviated and exceedingly general, this review recalls a few
of the local government "liability" highlights surveyed over the past
three decades. It likewise is sufficient, perhaps, to indicate why the
topic accounts for more than 20% of the appellate courts' local government diet during that period.
B.

Zoning
Finishing a distant second as litigation's favorite target in local
government law, "zoning" leaves a lengthy trail through the survey
articles. Unlike liability, legal principles of zoning fail to differentiate
between municipalities and counties. Like liability, zoning controversies
frequently arise in heated factual contexts, exuding passionate convictions and human emotions. Those controversies contribute considerable
color to the local government corpus.

27.

(1984).

See O.C.G.A. § 50-21-26 (1994); O.C.GA. 36-11-1 (1993); 36 MERCER L. REV. 1
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Zoning encapsulates local government's concern with its citizens' use
and enjoyment of land. Zoning law comprises the accommodation of that
concern with individual rights of ownership. Those rights enjoy
considerable sanctity in Anglo-American legal history That sanctity
yields somewhat erratically as the law seeks a happy confluence of
public regulation and individual liberty.
Regarding zoning in particular, the court decisions strongly reflect
their contemporary constitutional and statutory settings. This thirtyyear perspective reveals an initial period of minute Georgia General
Assembly control over local government zoning. That control derived
from the Georgia Constitution's specific direction. Early cases reflected
the view that having ratified the constitution, citizens must tolerate
considerable legislative discretion in property regulation. Illustratively,
the courts evidenced a restrictive approach to equitable remedies. A
property owner's mere anticipation of injury from a zoning ordinance
would not suffice for injunctive relief, and the owner could not mandamus the discretionary issuance of a zoning variance. Likewise, an owner
could take little solace in restrictive covenants: those covenants became
unenforceable after zoning laws were in effect for twenty years. Finally,
the courts were fairly strict in conferring the "aggrieved party" status
upon disgruntled property owners, the status necessary to elicit judicial
relief.
Conversely, the courts did insist upon local government compliance
with basic legislative mandates. For instance, statutes early required
that local governments formulate "zoning maps" as an element of their
procedures, and that they afford affected property owners "notice" of
contemplated zoning changes. As for the former, the courts invalidated
zoning ordinances devoid of maps, and devised exacting tests for an
ordinance's successful incorporation of the map by reference. Assuredly,
the map's existence could not be proved by parol evidence. As for notice,
the courts exhibited no qualms in establishing sufficient notification as
a necessary zoning prerequisite. Zoning (or rezoning) without notice, the
courts steadfastly declared, violated the landowner's due process.
In the mid-1970s, constitutional changes withdrew the General
Assembly from the traditional scheme, directly vesting zoning authority
in local governments themselves. Intriguingly, appellate decisions
almost immediately reflected a more active review of local zoning
actions. This increased judicial sensitivity invited additional complaints
from disgruntled property owners, and the supreme court found itself
inundated with zoning controversies. In an epic line of cases, the court
struggled to distinguish valid zoning from invalid confiscation. That
distinction turned, as the court formulated, upon shifting presumptions
and burdens. Original zoning enjoyed an initial presumption of validity;
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the property owner overcame that presumption by demonstrating
significant detriment and insubstantial relation to public interests. The
burden then shifted to the local government to justify the zoning.
Countless cases illustrated the exercise: On the one hand, a landowner
showed no substantial detriment simply by proof that rezoning would
increase property value. On the other hand, the government could not
rest refusal to rezone simply upon its conviction that additional
commercial property was not needed.
Other problems abounded. Once the landowner carried his burden
and the local government did not, what happened upon the government's
refusal to obey the court's rezoning order? Examining alternatives, the
court disapproved judicial rezoning; that action infringed upon legislative
functions.' The court was equally unenthusiastic about declaring the
subject property free from all zoning; that tactic potentially endangered
neighboring properties.2 In this dilemma, the court reflected a degree
of desperation. Perhaps, it counseled, the best solution might treat
members of the local governing authority to the penalties of criminal
contempt.30
Currently, the legislature appears tentatively, to have reentered the
zoning complex, and the appellate courts are monitoring local government compliance. Accordingly, the court declared statutory notice
requirements to be mandatory, with noncompliance invalidating local
zoning regulations. Conversely, the court rejected an expansive reading
of the statutory term, "rezoning decision." That term did not encompass
a text amendment to a zoning ordinance, under the statute's mandates
of posting and publication.
Other judicial confrontations continue in historic zoning settings. For
example, the decisional lines appear unusually close for determining
whether a landowner possesses a "vested interest" in a zoning classification. In this multifaceted context, complex issues of retroactivity, laches,
and governmental estoppel regularly rear their imposing countenances.
Equally fundamental, there is the developing issue of when local zoning
officials can be called to articulate their "intent" in taking various
actions. Thus far, the courts approach the issue by characterizing the
capacity of the officials' performance. The court would not permit
depositions of the governing authority regarding its respective members'
intentions in granting a rezoning application. A judicial proceeding
could not abide such testimony from a "legislator." Conversely, the court
approved interrogatories to a board of zoning appeals regarding its

28. Cobb County v. Wilson, 259 Ga. 685, 386 S.E.2d 128 (1989).
29. Id.
30. Id.
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members' intent in denying a zoning variance. Those members acted
administratively rather than legislatively, the court assessed, and their
intent was admissible.
Yet another intriguing zoning stand-off occurs when local government
confronts local government. Is local government property subject to local
government zoning regulations? In addressing this inherently internal
tension, the courts debate the wisdom of alternative solutions and draw
the lines of resolution. The episodes present anew the historic publicvs.-private dichotomy, a face-off demanding the utmost in judicial
resources.
A concluding reference might simply call attention to a daunting task
currently camped on zoning's doorstep. Essentially, that task involves
locating the precise point at which residential areas shade into
commercial development. The point changes over time, and local zoning
officials must make the initial call. The context is highly volatile, for
few experiences inflame citizens more than watching their residential
area "go" commercial. When it permits or refuses zoning changes in
"fringe areas," therefore, the zoning authority performs one of its most
litigation-laden functions. Currently, the appellate courts indicate that
local expertise counts for much in this performance, and manifest
studied reluctance to second guess that expertise.
C. "Officers and Employees"
"Local government" is, of course, but the concept. That concept
becomes a tangible entity through the conduct of specified individuals:
the officers and employees who daily operate the governmental
machinery. In their role as facilitators, these agents become focal points
for controversy. Indeed, cases concerning them have matched the
volume of zoning litigation over the past three decades. Essentially,
then, these cases look inward-they touch virtually every conceivable
aspect of the facilitators' consensual relationship to the entity. From
details of the relationship itself to far broader ramifications, officer-andemployee litigation sweeps the local government spectrum.
No "detail" is more fundamental than status itself. The cases unfold
a vast array of claims for and against the governmental agent's root of
position. A traditional instance of the contest arises from the general
prohibition against "conflicts of interest." With origins in both statute
and common law, the prohibition finds continuing employment as a basis
for challenging official status. A municipal mayor, for example, cannot
also occupy another position (e.g., city manager) over which, as mayor,
he holds supervisory power. A county commission chairman cannot
supervise himself as (for example) county road superintendent, and thus
cannot hold the latter position. In such instances, the common law
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forbids the officer from being his own boss; the inherent conflict of
interests invalidates the status.
Statutes echo the sentiment. Broadly, a member of the municipal
council cannot hold other municipal offices (e.g., the water board);
functionally, members of local governing authorities cannot vote to zone
properties in which they possess financial interests.
The prohibition finds ultimate expression in the federal constitution.
For example, a municipal mayor could not issue a valid search warrant
when the mayor had participated personally in the criminal investigation. Similarly, a justice of the peace could issue no valid arrest warrant
when also occupying the position of police dispatcher. In neither case
does the warrant emanate from the "neutral and detached magistrate"
required by the Fourth Amendment.
Conceding the governmental agent's original status, attempted
divestment from that status accounts for a mass of activity. Removal
and dismissal efforts blanket the litigational landscape. Whether the
unique proceeding in quo warranto, the less exotic dismissal for cause,
or the more unlikely trial in impeachment, efforts at termination occupy
a considerable survey span.
Over that span, modern personnel policies found their way into local
government law. Classified civil service protections claimed niches in
both municipal and county employment. From ex parte prohibitions, to
requirements of written charges, to merit system demands for clarity,
the protections pumped vitality into the local government employment
status. In contrast, removal procedures reared their countenances as
well: the historic reality of recall dawned on the local government
horizon. From basic constitutionality, to niceties of petition certification,
to enumerated grounds for recall, the procedure pumped new concerns
of electoral accountability into local government officialdom.
Aside from divestment of status, history also bristles with efforts at
regulating the workers' personal habits. Only two brief illustrations will
put the matter in telling perspective. On one level, there were the early
attempts at curtailing hair length in the governmental ranks. Cases of
the period reflect not only the regulations but the judicial inquiries into
specificity, validity, and vulnerability to challenge. On another level,
there were the later concerns with drug use in the governmental ranks.
Those cases featured urinalysis for marijuana, and reflected a generally
approving judicial reaction. Although the tests amounted to search and
seizure, the need was compelling, the results admissible, and the
constitutional concerns insufficient.
The surveyed period revealed interesting encounters between local
officials and the Grand Jury. A recurring scenario derived from the
Grand Jury's historic "inspection" of various local government opera-
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tions. When the "presentments" based on those inspections turn
unusually critical, the courts have afforded targeted officials relief by
orders of expurgation. Continuously, the courts have cautioned, the
Grand Jury's power encompasses presentments and indictments, not
general criticisms of unindictable activities. As for the indictment
process itself, legions of cases ponder critical statutory delineations
between local officials. The courts have expended considerable effort in
designating officials granted the right of Grand Jury appearance, and
the precise point at which the right attaches.
The past thirty years encompassed no less than a revolution in the law
of defamation. Impressively, that revolution originated with, and
inordinately impacted, officers of local government. With its epic 1964
decision in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,3 1 the United States
Supreme Court required local government officials in defamation actions
against the media to prove "actual malice." 2 Since 1964, those officials
have stood in line to parade their defamation complaints through
Georgia's appellate courts.
The complaints proved highly informative on at least two levels.
Practically, their allegations afford revealing glimpses into the daily
grind of local government administration. They evidence keen citizen
concerns with local government and the ensuing passions that engulf
public discussion. Defamation litigation mirrors, no less, the facilitation
of concept into entity.
Legally, defamation actions by local government officials have provided
the context for reshaping the common law. In administering New York
Times' considerable infusion of First Amendment concerns, the courts
have labored on several fronts. Much of the inquiry focused upon the
necessary components of "actual malice." Primarily, those components
translate into the "knowledge" or "reckless disregard" of falsity. The
courts have pursued an exercise in terms of art which has now consumed
three decades.
Finally, mention must be made of local government employee
"benefits." Contests over benefits-ranging from salary equity, to
overtime compensation, to retirement--crowd the appellate reports.
None however, receives attention equal to that devoted to workers'
compensation. As covered beneficiaries, local government employees
attest to work related mishaps in astonishing volume.
The traditional contest features the employee's claim to coverage and
payment. "Coverage," the cases reveal, is a multifaceted concept. It may
go initially to discovering the "principal contractor," an issue of
31. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
32. Id. at 279-80.
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particular concern in local government construction projects. Coverage
may also refer to "out of and in the course of' the employee's work.
Although on the job at the time, was the worker injured by virtue of his
employment? For example, a night watchman injured while hammering
with his pistol on his car enjoyed coverage; a worker injured while
fighting with another employee did not. Although not on the job at the
time, was the worker nevertheless injured by virtue of his employment?
For example, an off-duty police officer injured on a private security job
enjoyed coverage; an employee injured while playing on his department's
softball team did not.
Finally, the aftermath of a workers' compensation award might prove
troublesome, even to the employee. Cases depict the courts determining
whether, and how, awards (periodic or lump sum) might later impact the
employee's pension. Additionally, there is the "exclusive remedy" facet
of workers' compensation. Ironically, therefore, some later cases feature
employee efforts to "escape" from workers' compensation coverage (or to
establish a separate "duty") in order to pursue more attractive tort
remedies.
Truly, local government officers and employees levied a heavy toll
upon judicial resources during the surveyed period.
D.

"Powers"

The "power" characterization describes the final of local government
law's four most controversial topics. The appellation itself furnishes the
topic a somewhat different cast. Obviously, it is a more general
reference, lacking the signaled focus of the other topics. It cuts across
specifically substantive concerns and is potentially less informative. At
the same time, the term captures several unifying themes that operate
throughout local government litigation.
No power theme echoes with greater resonance than that centering on
source. Thus, the courts tirelessly intone, local governments possess
only those powers expressly or impliedly granted to them. Moreover, the
source of the grant must be located with specificity in the constitution
or statutes. Finally, the grant receives a "strict" judicial construction;
if there is doubt as to its efficacy, no power passes to the local government. From these source themes, then, all discussion of local government power takes root.
Dealing with a vast assortment of specifics, the courts engaged the
basic exercise. Whether relegating "trailer parks" to specific locales,
banishing heavy trucks from downtown streets, mandating "favored
treatment" status for contracts, granting exclusive cable television
franchises, providing service for private sewer lines, or collecting
franchise fees, the local government effort received the same judicial
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scrutiny. Was there an express grant of the power? If not, was the
endeavor one pursuable under implied power? If so, could a grant be
located arguably sustaining the implication? If so, was that grant
situated in a "general welfare" delegation or in a less expansive posture?
If general welfare, was the undertaking compatible with police power
authorization? Wherever situated, could the grant be strictly construed
to supply the necessary fire power? This basic exercise both backstops
and dominates judicial treatment of local government power.
There is a second step in the traditional power analysis. Once the
existence of the power grant is located, examination then turns to the
manner of its exercise. Was that exercise-as encompassed in ordinance,
resolution, or the like-a "reasonable" one? Or, did the effort constitute
an "abuse" of the local government's discretion? This inquiry proceeds
under a distinctly different judicial approach. Rather than auguring
strictly against the exercise, now the analysis "presumes" its reasonableness. Whether disposing of its electrical distribution system, refusing
tap-ins to its sewer system, discontinuing a sewage treatment plant,
abandoning a public road, restricting portable display signs, changing
street names, or requiring towing services to accept credit cards, the
effort receives similar scrutiny. Short of local government arbitrariness,
corruption, or gross abuse of discretion, the courts defer. They eschew
substituting their judgment, in matters ofjudgment, for that of the local
government.
In structuring one dichotomy, the courts expended enormous energies
upon another. Thus, the decisions frequently turned "use" or "abuse" of
discretion upon the distinction between a "right" and a "privilege." The
local government enjoyed far more discretion if the target of its power
was characterized as a "privilege." The distinction could be a close one:
The use of municipal streets for ordinary travel is a citizen's "right;" the
use of those streets for operating a taxi business is a "privilege."
At the inception of the survey period, few activities smacked more
strongly of "privilege" than the sale of alcoholic beverages. Consequently, the local government enjoyed virtually absolute power to regulate or
prohibit such sales. Over time, the courts diluted that power by
requiring, first, that the government formulate and adopt standards for
issuing alcoholic beverage licenses. Next, the courts condemned local
government denial of a license to an applicant meeting the adopted
standards.. Such denial, the courts held, violated equal protection and
entitled the applicant to a writ of mandamus. Accordingly, the dismantling of the fabled "right vs. privilege" distinction constituted a significant judicial movement of the past thirty years.
As previously indicated, the power exercise meshed with the general
issue of constitutionality. At the first plateau, the local government
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ordinance must clear the hurdle of "void for vagueness." That hurdle
seeks to insure that the governed can reasonably comprehend the power
to which they are subjected. For example, a county ordinance could not
expressly reserve discretion in the governing authority to determine
whether issuance of a beverage license was "in the best interests of the
county."' With no stated standards for judging those "best interests,"
citizens lacked the knowledge necessary for compliance. On other
occasions, the measure may be clear but nevertheless meaningless; for
instance, a municipal ordinance prohibited the driver of a vehicle from
looking "in any direction other than that in which he is traveling."'
The constitutional analysis then steps up to more sophisticated
conundrums-issues such as Equal Protection and First Amendment.
Over time, the latter pendulum swung from adult movie houses and
bookstores to the live performance of nude dancing. Equal Protection,
of course, covers the local government waterfront, emerging in such
diverse contexts as penalizing well digging and selecting a landfill site.
Indeed, it may afford protection against local government electricity:
One wishing to live without electricity in the wires of his house should
be able to do so, the court announced, "whether or not our constitution
says anything about freedom from electricity."35
Concluding note might be taken of the governmental tensions that
surface in power contests. Conflicts emerge both between and within the
governmental entities themselves. Physical arrangements necessarily
result in intergovernmental stand-offs. From one perspective, these
include the county construction of a road within municipal limits, and
the county's exaction of fees for municipal use of a landfill. From the
other perspective, there is the extension of municipal water mains into
the county's unincorporated area, and the municipality's higher charges
for county water consumers. These are disrupting power conflicts in
local government law.
The intragovernmental face-offs are equally severe. These are of more
modern vintage, arising primarily in the county sphere. On a number
of occasions, the county governing authority has found itself in open
confrontation with other nonjudicial branches of county government. A
county recreation board challenged the commissioners' failure to provide
operating funds; and a county sheriff charged commissioners with
virtually dismantling his law enforcement capabilities. Other occasions
instanced conflicts between the commissioners and county judicial
officials. For example, the commissioners and a juvenile court judge vied
33. Arras v. Herrin, 255 Ga. 11, 334 S.E.2d 677 (1985).
34. Gregory v. Chalker, 116 Ga. App. 126, 156 S.E.2d 390 (1967).
35. Frier v. City of Douglas, 233 Ga. 775, 213 S.E.2d 607 (1975).

1994]

A REFLECTION ON THIRTY SURVEYS

for control of the juvenile detention facility; and commissioners contested
a state court judge's efforts to hire a second judge. These intracounty
confrontations entail governmental waste and disharmony; they show no
signs of abating; and they promise troublesome power controversy in the
local government legal arena.
IV.

OBSERVATIONS FROM THE ORACLES

With three decades of judicial decisions encapsulated, it seems only
appropriate to turn for comment to the courts rendering those decisions.
Although no present judge or justice claims tenure for the entire survey
period, they are the current members of the court of appeals and the
supreme court. Their respective positions thus provide valuable sources
of insight; indeed, any observations from them constitute the ultimate
in "informed perspective."
Obviously, any reflections solicited from the jurists must be brief,
general, and anonymous. Their work loads and the sensitivity of their
tasks preclude time consuming and detail revealing responses. The
questionnaire sent to each of them attempted to acknowledge those
realities and yet to invite helpful contributions. 6 Whether the effort
would succeed depended, of course, upon its efficacy in reaching the
sympathies of the judges and justices.
To their great credit, eleven of the sixteen jurists returned the
questionnaires, a response rate of 68.7%."7 Discussion now turns to
those responses.
A

PriorExposure to Local Government Law

Initially, the questionnaire sought to glean insight into the backgrounds of the respondents themselves. It undertook to determine the
jurists' exposure to local government law prior to ascending the appellate
bench.
Specifically, Question Three on the survey focused upon the respondent's prior law practice: Did that practice involve work in local

36. The questionnaire consisted of 15 brief inquiries, most to be answered by checking
an optional response, with opportunity for elaboration. The questions emphasized the most

general of local government law aspects, purposely avoiding requests for the jurists'
analytical views on substantive points. A cover letter assured the recipients of complete

anonymity in the treatment of their responses and pleaded for their assistance.
37. The total 16 derives, of course, from the seven justices on the supreme court and
the nine judges on the court of appeals. No delineation between the courts was attempted.

Sincerest appreciation is extended to each of the 11 respondents-truly, your kindness was
overwhelming.
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government law?" Of the eleven responses, eight answered, "Yes." As
either a city attorney, county attorney, or general practitioner, the
respondent had previously confronted the legal principles of local
government. 39
A companion question (Question Four) checked judicial backgrounds.
Prior to becoming an appellate judge, the question inquired, "were you
a trial court judge involved in trying local government law cases?'4
Here the responses broke almost evenly: Five answered "Yes" and six
answered "No." Almost one-half the respondents, therefore, had
previously judged local government litigation from a distinctively
different judicial perspective.4 '
The appellate judges, reflecting upon three decades of local government law were not, therefore, novices to the subject. Either a law
practice or a trial judgeship had previously acquainted a substantial
number with legal principles of local government. That exposure
necessarily accompanied them to the appellate courts and played a role
in their questionnaire assessments.

TABLE IX
APPELLATE JUDGES' PRIOR LOCAL GovERNmENT LAw

Yes
No

B.

ExPosuRE

Law Practice

Trial Judgeship

8 (73%)
3 (27%)

5 (45%)
6 (55%)

General Reactions to Findings

The questionnaire next directed the appellate judges' attention to the
thirty-year excursion. First, inquiry sought a general reaction to the
total number of local government cases (roughly 1,563) decided during

38. R. Perry Sentell, Jr., Local Government Law Cases in the Georgia Appellate Courts,
Survey to Judges, Georgia Court of Appeals, and Justices, Supreme Court of Georgia (1994)
thereinafter Appellate Judges Survey) (on file with author). Question Three, Appellate
Judges Survey (1994).

39. Positions held included that of city attorney, county attorney, board of education
attorney, county hospital authority attorney. General practice involvement included trying
plaintiff's tort claims and ad valorem tax litigation.
40. Question Four, Appellate Judges Survey (1994).

41. Trial court involvement included local government property condemnations, zoning
appeals, and housing authority cases.
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the period.4 2 Scattering themselves across the range of optional
responses, the respondents reacted as follows: five found the total about
as expected; one thought the total "slightly less" than expected; one
deemed the total "considerably less" than expected; two judged the total
"slightly more" than expected; and one found the total "considerably
more" than expected." Although no single option drew a majority of
responses, perhaps it was noteworthy that seven of the eleven jurists
would have expected a thirty-year total at least as high as the one
discovered." It was no surprise to them, therefore, that local government law comprised a substantial part of the appellate judiciary's
diet.
A follow-up question then elicited reactions to the pattern in which the
cases divided. Upon being informed that 772 cases involved municipalities, and 791 cases involved counties," nine respondents found the
division about as expected, and one would have expected more municipal
cases.47 Both majority and minority responses were of interest: the
first simply because of its virtual unanimity, and the second for its
thoughtfulness. Thus, "one would expect the ratio to approximate the
ratio of cities to counties.""
Delving still further into division patterns, a later question elaborated
the "top four" subjects litigated in local government law: Liability;
Zoning; Officers and Employees; and Powers.49 In reacting to this order
of contest popularity, the respondents again found themselves near
unanimity: nine viewed the order "about as expected," and only one
registered surprise." Among majority comments, there was the opinion
that "Liability" in local government law simply tracked liability in
litigation generally, and mild surprise that there were not more "Zoning"
cases. 1 Additionally, one respondent "would have expected slightly

42. Question One, Appellate Judges Survey (1994).
43. Responses to Question One, Appellate Judges Survey (1994).
44. This included the five "about-as-expected-jurists," plus the two who found the total
less than expected.
45. As one "about-as-expected-respondent" thoughtfully elaborated: "Actually, I would
not have given much thought to numbers but rather more to percentages. I would expect
that a significant percentage of cases involve local government because it has such a wide
variety of activities and interactions with citizens."
46. Question Two, Appellate Judges Survey (1994).
47. One respondent checked no response to the question.
48. Responses to Question Two, Appellate Judges Survey (1994).
49. Question Thirteen, Appellate Judges Survey (1994).
50. Responses to Question Thirteen, Appellate Judges Survey (1994). One respondent
registered no response.
51. Id.
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more 'Powers' cases than 'Officers and Employees' cases." 2 The lone
dissenter's surprise went not to order of popularity but rather to the
point that it was not more so: "I would have thought more liability
cases."
Having established a general lack of surprise at the four most
controversial subjects in local government law, the questionnaire pressed
the jurists for possible explanations. What "unifying theme" among the
four topics "might account for their 'popularity' as litigated subjects?' M
This inquiry proved perplexing to the respondents: four provided no
answer at all, and one simply could not account.55 The six remaining
judges and justices offered a variety of "explanations." Three judges
focused upon the popularity of "Liability"-two perceiving the "deep
pocket" phenomenon,56 and one observing that judges generally find
tort cases "more interesting." 7 Two respondents reached for a broader
theme: "All of these cases involve the impact of governmental authority
on individual rights-directly or indirectly."" Finally, there was denial
that the four subjects possessed a unifying theme: "[Riather, 'popularity'
stems from changes in the law and therefore the need for precedent
when the law changes."59

TABLE X
APPELLATE JUDGES' REACTIONS TO CASE VOLUME AND TYPE

Total Cases
Municipal/County Division
Top Four Subjects Litigated

About as
Expected
5 (45%)
9 (82%)
9 (82%)

Different from
Expected
5 (45%)
1 (9%)
1 (9%)

No Response
1 (9%)
1 (9%)
1 (9%)

52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Question Fourteen, Appellate Judges Survey (1994).
55. "I really do not know-neither do I know what the 'unpopular' litigated subjects
would include." Responses to Question Fourteen, Appellate Judges Survey (1994);
56. E.g., "opportunity to collect from public purse."
57. Responses to Question Fourteen, Appellate Judges Survey (1994).
58. Id. Again, "For the most part, plaintiffs seek less government power and less
sovereign or official immunity."
59. Id.
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C. Observations on Local Government Lawyers
At this juncture, the questionnaire took a major leap of faith. Shifting
its inquisitorial thrust completely, the effort sought a value judgment
from the appellate judges. Cognizant of the jurists' reluctance to issue
such assessments, but desperately in need, Question Six requested
judiciary evaluation of local government counsel. In the appellate
judges' opinion, were those counsel, in comparison with lawyers arguing
other cases before the courts: "of average ability"; "of above average
Would Georgia's appellate
ability"; or "of below average ability?6'
judges render such an evaluation?
They would. With all respondents responding, two opted for "average
ability," and nine coalesced on the conclusion of "above average
ability." * The appellate judges, therefore, each responding independently and confidentially to the question, registered extremely high
praise for the legal representation afforded local governments. Their
elaborations, moreover, confirmed the results: "[Ilt is unusual for me to
get a poor brief or hear a poor argument from an attorney representing
a local government."62 Once again: "I have been very favorably
This was striking value
impressed by city and county lawyers."'
testimony from a realm where restraint and circumspection reign
supreme, a realm not given to ability blandishments for advocates. The
fact, however, remains: Of all eleven responding judges and justices, not
one rated local government attorneys "of below average ability."
The focus upon local government lawyers next turned to an especially
prominent concern, that of legal ethics. From the perspective of the
appellate courts, Question Seven inquired, "what is the local government
attorney's most pressing ethical problem?"' Reflecting the difficulty
of the subject perhaps, two respondents offered no opinion, and two
Seven of the jurists did reply,
confessed to having no response.'
however, with considerable insight. The majority sentiment centered
upon "conflicts of interest." Several respondents were content simply to
employ the phrase without elaboration,6 but some were a bit more
60. Question Six, Appellate Judges Survey (1994).
61. Responses to Question Six, Appellate Judges Survey (1994).
62. Id.
63. Id. To the extent there may be a variation in quality, it could be explained: "The
degree of stability in local government representation causes this to vary in some
localities." Id.
64. Question Seven, Appellate Judges Survey (1994).
65. Responses to Question Seven, Appellate Judges Survey (1994).
66. Id. E.g., "Conflicts of interest." Again: "Over the long haul, I think conflicts of
interest are most pressing." Id.
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specific. For instance, there was concern over "avoiding real or apparent
conflicts of interest between representation of local government and the
remainder of the attorney's practice."
Another answer located the
conflict potential on a different plateau: "Probably [the] balance between
interests of local officials and local government. " "
Other respondents identified ethical concerns of a more basic
complexion; for example, attorneys having to deal "with individual
improprieties by elected officials whom they represent as government
officials. " '6 A final caution went to the far more fundamental tension
inherent in being a government lawyer: "Avoiding becoming an advocate
for 'policy' as opposed to a legal position."7

TABLE XI
APPELLATE JUDICIAL OBSERVATIONS ON LOCAL
GOVERNMENT LAWYERS
Above Average

Average

Below Average

9 (82%)

2 (18%)

0 (0%)

D. Observations on Local Government Law
With lawyer evaluations in place, the questionnaire could no longer
postpone its sensitive substantive mission. The judges of the court of
appeals and the justices of the supreme court simply must be queried on
local government law itself.
The questions attempted the delicate balance between overall
institutional impressions and specific legal issues. They focused on
"frivolous litigation" as the first object of inquiry. Compared with other
cases, Question Five implored, would the appellate judges deem frivolous
litigation in local government law to be: "about average"; "less than
average"; or "greater than average"?7 1 With one respondent deferring,7 2 the remaining answers divided as follows:
Four responses

67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.

Id.
Id.
Responses to Question Seven, Appellate Judges Survey (1994).
Id.
Question Five, Appellate Judges Survey (1994).
"1Ido not know." Responses to Question Five, Appellate Judges Survey (1994).
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registered "about average,"7 and six settled upon "less than average."74 According to the appellate judges who observe it daily, therefore, local government litigation traveled a fairly high ethical road.
Assuredly, those judges did not perceive that litigation as infected by the
dissipating insignificance that regrettably characterizes some other legal
provinces. Strikingly, not a single respondent cast such an aspersion.
The next substantive inquiry moved from legitimacy to complexity.
Question Eight requested the appellate judges to rate local government
legal issues in terms of relative difficulty. "As compared with issues in
other cases," the question elaborated, would respondents rate local
government law issues to be: "of average complexity"; "of less than
average complexity"; or "of more than average complexity?" 5 Here, not
a single respondent declined to answer; four checked "average complexity," and seven deemed "greater than average" to be the appropriate
characterization.7 6 Thus, the local government road was not only high,
it also traversed a difficult terrain.
How might local government law's complexity impact upon judicial
ability to decide? Compared with other cases, Question Ten queried,
how did the appellate courts "typically" stand on local government
issues? Were those courts: "more of one mind;" "less of one mind;" or of
"about the same" mind as in other cases?77 Five respondents perceived
their courts "more of one mind;" two opted for "less of one mind;" and
four responses detected no appreciable difference.78 Each of the
extreme positions claimed supporting rationale. The "more of one mind"
position perceived a "relatively uniform [judicial] deference to the
discretion of a [local government] governing body."7 Contrarily, the
"less of one mind" view reasoned that "issues like zoning, recall statutes,
immunity and conflicts of interest so often involve policy values of the
individual judge."B°

73. Id. One respondent confessed that his or her answer 'may be something of a copout on the question of what is 'frivolous.'" Another thought the frivolousness "average for
deep-pocket defendants." Id.
74. Id. "Most of it revolves around the issues of sovereign immunity or official
immunity, which still confuse many litigants and lawyers." Id.
75. Question Eight, Appellate Judges Survey (1994).
76. Responses to Question Eight, Appellate Judges Survey (1994). As one respondent
noted, "I think they are more complex because of my lack of familiarity with them." Id.
77. Question Ten, Appellate Judges Survey (1994).
78. Responses to Question Ten, Appellate Judges Survey (1994).
79. Id.
80. Id.

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 46

Minority view and rationale aside, local government law's perceived
penchant for complexity failed to translate into greater dissention within
the appellate courts. Nine of the eleven responding judges and justices
(81 percent) discerned no material decrease in unanimity simply because
their courts confronted an issue of local government law.
A final inquiry went to specific identifying marks. "Based on your
experience," Question Nine besieged the jurists, "what would you
designate as the singularly distinguishing characteristic of local
government law litigation?"' This inquiry, without suggestive optional
answers, left the respondents completely at large. That fact perhaps,
exacerbated by the question's inordinate demand, resulted in four
failures to respond. Of the seven answers tendered, three selected the
8 2 Local government
issue of sovereign immunity.
law is distinctively
characterized, they believed, by "the fact that one must nearly always
check to determine if an immunity issue is in the case.'
Another
respondent approached the inquiry from the standpoint of issue
delineation: "Compared to all other types of litigation," the judge
observed in local government cases "there appear to be more issues of
law and fewer of fact."' 4 Remaining responses focused upon the local
governing body; that body, they perceived, distinctively shaped the local
government attorney's practice. One observation emphasized complications injected "by disagreement between the members of the governing
authority."80 Another pointed to "the predictable response by the
governing body to the outcry... of a particular interest group."'
The appellate judges, it thus turned out, harbored-and were generous
in sharing--extremely informative views on the institution of local
government law.

81. Question Nine, Appellate Judges Survey (1994).
82. Responses to Question Nine, Appellate Judges Survey (1994).
83. Id. Others' responses: "The issue of sovereign immunity and government liability";
"Immunity. Government functions would be next." Id.

84. Responses to Question Nine, Appellate Judges Survey (1994).
85. Id.
86. Id. Usually, the respondent noted, this group would consist of "anti-zoning
citizens." Finally, one respondent observed of local government law that "it isn't always

very exciting." Id.
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TABLE XII
APPELLATE OBSERVATIONS ON LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW

Frivolous Litigation
Issue Complexity
Judicial Unanimity

E.

Average
4 (36%)
4 (36%)
4 (36%)

More
0 (0%)
7 (64%)
5 (45%)

Less
6 (55%)
0 (0%)
2 (18%)

No Response
1 (9%)
0 (0%)
0 (0%)

Suggestions for Improvement

The questionnaire's concluding inquiries turned to the future. Two
questions recounted that the three decades under scrutiny overlapped a
number of state constitutions and codifications. The questions then
solicited the appellate judges for suggestions on constitutional or
statutory changes8 7 As expected, and understandably, the jurists were
largely reluctant to project themselves into this advisory role. Aside
from the mere mention of such items as sovereign immunity, consolidation procedures, development authorities, and ante litem notice
requirements, the respondents offered little of note.'
The final question on the survey fared slightly better: "As an
appellate judge, what single message would you most like to have
conveyed to students of Georgia local government law?"' Although a
number of the jurists again deferred, a few responded with obvious
convictions. One of these lamented upon the present "body" of the law:
"Local government law has become a hodgepodge of legal precepts
sometimes lacking logic or cohesiveness. This results in the failure to
Another took the occasion to
develop a body of law on the subject.'
disparage the belief that "it is government's responsibility to solve all
problems incurred by the citizenry" Government "does not have this
ability," the caution continued, "and like medicine, should be taken in as
small a dosage as possible." 1
Two of the appellate judges instructed upon the proper tools for
working in the vineyards of local government law. Interestingly, the
instructions differed. One direction was to legislation: "Be thoroughly

87. Questions Eleven and Twelve, Appellate Judges Survey (1994).
88. Responses to Questions Eleven and Twelve, Appellate Judges Survey (1994).
89. Question Fifteen, Appellate Judges Survey (1994).
90.

Responses to Question Fifteen, Appellate Judges Survey (1994).

91. Id.
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familiar with the statutes involving local government law."' To make
the point, the respondent confided that "my cases are decided strictly on
the statutes."93 The other direction was to the constitution: "Study, be
conversant with, and use the Georgia Constitution.' 4 Indeed, that
constitution should be recognized "as the first constitutional authority,
in front of rather than behind ...the federal constitution.'
Perhaps the most beneficial advice was also the most brief: "These are
not waters to tread into lightly."96
V. CONCLUSION
To chronicle Georgia local government law annually for a period of
thirty years is an intriguing experience. To then reflect upon those
efforts in mass only enhances the intrigue. That reflection gives rise to
a myriad of good memories and an assortment of substantive impressions.
The subject blends a wondrous mix of government, people who act for
government, and people affected by those actions. It would be difficult
to conceive a more challenging role for legal order. That challenge,
necessarily brushed by inherent political facets, lays claim to considerable public attention. It receives inordinately specific treatment in
constitutional formulation and remains the object of continuous statutory
revision. No wonder that its corpus is an ever developing one. No
wonder as well that it provides abundant grist for the judicial mills.
Those mills have ground grandly over the past three decades. Review
of the results reveals that much has changed and that much remains the
same. Local governments, as creatures of the state, must operate within
their respective domains of delegated authority. Determining the limits
of those domains constitutes, as ever, the ultimate judicial exercise.
Across the range of local government endeavors, the appellate courts
draw, and redraw, the lines of "law." Some of those lines appear
satisfyingly settled, some fluctuate in frustrating transition, and some
blur with disquieting uncertainty.
These conditions are the features of the thirty survey articles. They
are the features of this reflection upon those surveys. They are the
features of appellate judicial reaction to the surveys. They are the
features of "Local Government Law."

92. Id.

93. Id. (emphasis in original.)
94. Id. (emphasis in original.)
95. Id. (emphasis in original.)
96. Id.

